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In 1950 the small rural Reserve of Witsieshoek in the Orange Free
State made national headlines when migrant workers, peasants and
chiefs openly revolted against the implementation of agricultural
'betterment' in the area. The revolt came twelve years after
'betterment' was introduced. In 1938 the Department of Native
Affairs divided Witsieshoek into five grazing camps as a
first step towards reducing livestock and controlling
overgrazing. In terms of this scheme the onus was placed on local
chiefs to ensure that 'poor quality' stock be forwarded to the
local administration for culling. In 1939 the authority of chiefs
was further undermined when the state decided to redistribute all
agricultural land in the Reserve. In terms of this scheme 1500
three morgan plots were demarcated for a population of over 2600
households (UG 26-51: 17).
By 1942 'betterment' had achieved some results. Most of the
existing agricultural land had been reallocated and all but one
small settlement, situated in the demarcated grazing zones, had
been successfully relocated. The refusal of Chief Howel Mopeli
and his son Mopelinyana to relocate marked the beginning of local
resistance to 'betterment' in Witsieshoek. In defying the
authorities Howel Mopeli claimed that he was the authentic
paramount chief of the Bakwena people in the Reserve and that he
would not allow his people to be dispossessed of their land and
livestock by an 'unjust' admininstration. His challenge was
clearly directed as much against the incumbent paramount, Charles
Mopeli, who had choosen to co-operate with the administration on
the issue of 'betterment', as it was against the state. Popular
support for Howel Mopeli was, however, initially limited because
Reserve inhabitants had been led to believe that stock culling
was a voluntary measure (Roberts 1949: 7).
By the mld-1940s it was clear that the state had no intention of
allowing migrants and peasants to make their own choices about
culling. Stock owners were now ordered to produce their animals
for grading and culling. Howel Mopeli again refused to comply
with the regulations, and when he was taken to court he won his
case on the technical point that he was not personally informed
of state's intention to cull. As culling proceeded Howel Mopeli's
popularity increased among villagers and migrants who lamented
the extent to which Paramount Charles Mopeli was prepared to
collaborate with state officials. They also realised that culling
favoured the tribal elite, whose large herds were being trimmed
only marginally relative to those of smaller owners. Lodge (1983:
272) claims that some people lost oxen in the culls, and owning
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no draft animals, were unable to plough their allotments. The
haphazard and indiscriminant manner in which 'betterment' was
imposed in Witsieshoek created scope for a popular allaince to be
forged between dissident chiefs, migrants and peasants. Mobilised
behind the long-standing migrant association, Linqangala ('those
who stand firm'), the petty-bourgeois leadership of the
resistance movement managed to transcend the narrow limitations
of tribal politics and the constraints of their class position.
They associated widely outside the Reserve, sending delegations
to speak to both the ANC and the South African Communist Party,
as well as employing liberal elements within the government to
plead their case (Marony 1976).
In 1950 the Witsieshoek Rebellion was effectively supressed. Its
leaders were imprisoned or bannished from the Reserve. An uneasy
silence fell over the whole area as local inhabitants were forced to
rebuild fences and to comply with the official limit of ten units
of livestock per household. This ensured that long-established
processes of class differentiation in the Reserve were abruptly
checked. As one agricultural officer candidly wrote to his
brother in 1950, 'betterment' has been "just another means of
bringing poverty and misery to the Native so that the White man
can be assured of adequate labour for his mines, his industries,
his farms and his homes" (Roberts 1950: 2). But the Witsieshoek
rebellion was more than a "desperate final act of resistance to
proletarianisation" (Lodge 1983: 273), it was a statement of
political unity among the Reserve's inhabitants against the state
and the co-opted Bakwena tribal elite. Indeed, in 1985 the
incident was still remembered locally as episode of popular
resistance which successfully bound people together across class
and clan barriers. This feat has not been repeated subsequently,
in spite of the re-emergence of petty-bourgeois elements whose
locally-rooted class interests and political objectives have, at
specific junctures, been inextricably linked with those of the
resident working class.
It is my aim in this paper to trace the slow re-emergence of
class differentiation in Witsieshoek after the rebellion and to
the consider the implications of this process for political
struggles waged in Qwaqwa during the contemporary phase of
'homeland self-government'. The paper focuses centrally on the
emergence of a commercial petty bourgeoisie in the Qwaqwa since
the 1960 and its changing political profile over the past two
decades. In developing this analysis I focus mainly on licensed
retail traders in Qwaqwa. My discussion proceeds in three parts.
The first part deals with the period 1960 to 1974 and is
dominated by an investigation of the activities of the Bantu
Investment Corporation (BIC) in Qwaqwa. The second section of the
paper concentrates on the period 1974-1980, a phase of mass
population relocation and rapid economic differentiation. It
concentrates on the unfolding of political struggle between the
homeland political elite and the emergent commercial petty
bourgeoisie. In the final section of the paper I focus on
changing economic opportunities for African traders in the early
1980s as they are brought under the wing of the Qwaqwa
Development Corporation and the Mopeli government. The paper
concludes on a comparative note by addressing similarities and
difference in the changing political strategies of traders in
Qwaqwa in the face of economic centralisation with those of
storekeepers and artisans in ninetenth century Europe.
'A Wolf in a Sheepskin'
The Bantu Investment Corporation, 1960-1974
The existing literature on the Bantu Investment Corporation
invariably presents this organisation as a success in promoting
the cause of African class formation in the bantustans. This
conclusion is particularly common among analysts of the Transkei.
Molteno (1977), in his early contribution to the debate on rural
class formation, argued that the BIC was instrumental in
producing a shift away from the 'class levelling' tendencies of
the Reserve strategy towards the 'class forming' tendencies of
the Bantustan strategy. In his more detailed discussion of the
Transkei, Southall (1983) substantiates this conclusion when he
argues that the BIC played an active role in advancing capital
loans to local entrepreneurs and expropriating businesses from
white traders. He notes that during the 1960s the BIC (working
through its local agency the Xhosa Development Corporation)
dispossessed 423 white traders of their stores, and by 1972 had
transferred more than half of these to African owners. This
figure doubled by 1975 and on the eve of 'Independence' 473 of a
total of 562 expropriated stores were firmly in the hands of
Xhosa owners.
Although it cannot be disputed that the BIC played a constructive
role in overturning white commercial monopoly and promoting black
commercial interests in the Transkei, it remains open to question
whether the BIC played an equally constructive role in the other
bantustans. In the case of Witsieshoek there is little evidence
to support a favourable assessment of BIC's role in advancing the
interests of Basotho entrepreneurs. The acceptance of 'homeland
self-government' in Witsieshoek made little impact on the BIC,
which throughout the 1960s failed dislodge white trading concerns
in the area. It also put a firm break on the issuing of
additional trading licences to Africans, arguing that the Reserve
was already overtraded. Of the 15 applications for trading
licences received in Witsieshoek during the 1960s, only one new
licences was granted. In fact, the number of businesses operating
in Witisieshoek actually shrunk from 39 in 1959 to 26 in 1967
[1]. The BIC's insistence that it would only support candidates
of proven ability posed serious problems in the OFS where white
municipalities had prohibited Basotho entrepreneurs from setting
up licensed undertakings. In the absence of 'adequately qualified
candidates' it appears that the BIC took it upon itself to set up
viable business operations to deal with the local consumer
market. The shower of complaints brought before the Qwaqwa
Legislative Assembly in 1974 reflected this. As one speaker
enquired:
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I would like to know why it happens that when one applies for a
certain business, then, when you wipe your eyes, you see the BIC
opening up such a business...I do not know why the BIC gets
involved in such applications! (QLA 1974: 90)
Another speaker went further suggesting that the BIC was in the
process of taking over all retail stores in the area:
The BIC does not apply anywhere for permission to run
businesses, but merely comes in like a wolf in a sheepskin. We
may think that it is our people who are running businesses,
only to find out that it is a camouflage, a bluff (QLA 1974:
104)
Attempts by the BIC to take hold of the Qwaqwa economy during the
1960s were not confined to the retail sector. In 1965, for
instance, the BIC undermined a number of local dairy co-
operatives by placing them directly under the control of the
state (Mapena 1970: 290ff). This step followed the incorporation
of a dairy farm into Qwaqwa and ensured that previously
independent milk suppliers were placed under the close
supervision of white agricultural officers. A further example of
the BIC's interventionist tendencies occurred in 1967 when the
Corporation put Qwaqwa's two largest transport entrepreneurs out
of business. Realising that a free market in transport was
inimical to the state's economic decentralisation programme, the
BIC entered into a partnership with two small bus operators to
establish a new monopoly, Setsokotsane Bus Service. The exclusion
of local owners, who had dominated the local transport business
since the 1950s, was seen as a gross injustice. In 1974 a member
of the Legislative Assembly reflected on the prospects of the
Setsokotsane agreement:
The BIC was brought [into the transport market] when local bus
owners asked for their assistence, but I can assure you that it
has subsequently drowned these owners. Originally, before
Setsoktsane was established there were four chickens [Twala,
Mohamane, Modingwana and Motaung]. But only two remain. I
cannot give you the assurance that they will live very
long...It is impossible for a hawk to look after a chicken,
because the hawk will certainly eat that chicken! (QLA 1974:
106) [2].
In responding to this kind of criticism the BIC made no bones
about its intention to dominate homeland transport and suggested
in 1974 that local bus owners were "not professionally equipped
to deal with rising demand" (BIC Annual Report 1974: 8).
The orientation of state economic policy toward control during
the BIC era was also manifested in the small manufacturing sector
in Qwaqwa. One of the most glaring examples of this was seen in
the mass closure of independent brickyards along the Namahadi
river in 1972. With the advent of mass population relocation and
the associated construction of the Phuthaditjhaba township,
Qwaqwa experienced a dramatic increase in the demand for building
materials. Local entrepreneurs responded quickly to this demand
by hiring plots from the Bakwena tribal authority to set up
brickyards on the flood plain of the Namahadi river. From 1970
onwards this area became a hive of activity with dozens of
families staking out their claims or sub-leasing from established
operators. Most of these operators sold their bricks to the
government at the fixed rate of R15 per 1000. Even though these
rates were highly exploitative, local owners were still able to
extract respectable profits by relying on the abundance of cheap
farm labour now available in the homeland. In short, the opening
up of the brick market provided both valuable employment for men
and women relocated from white farms as well as facilitating a
certain amount of petty accumulation by aspirant Basotho
entrepreneurs in an open and competitive market.
These developments however came to an abrupt end in 1974 when it
was announced by the BIC that the entire brick trade would be
ceded to only four individuals. This decision outraged local
owners and workers. The brickyards had become the single largest
employer in Qwaqwa and hundreds of jobs had been placed in
jeopardy by this shock declaration. The issue received urgent
attention during the 1975 sitting of the Legislative Assembly
where the implications of this move were discussed. One speaker
commented on the employment opportunities created by the trade:
I know of people, Mr Chairman, who came from the farms. When
they arrived they were so hungry they could not even greet us,
in such poor condition were they. They were content with
putting on sacks and making bricks. At the end of the month
they were in a position to buy flour (QLA 1975: 110)
In lamenting the new restrictions most speakers were unequivocal
in their allocation of blame. Mr S. I. Mohamane had the following
to say:
Our children used to work at the brickyards; our brothers and
our wives used to work there, having bought sites they could
manufacture their own bricks, but a monster [the BIC] which is
the owner of this homeland came along and...has chased
them away (QLA 1975: 98)
Even more perplexing than the decision by the state to restrict
local brickmaking was its exclusion of the most professionally
equipped entrepreneurs from its attempts at economic
rationalisation. In 1972 by far the most capitalised Basotho
brickmaker in Qwaqwa was the building contractor, George
Mofokeng, who owned imported technology capable of producing 30
000 bricks a day. He was prevented from installing this machine
on the grounds that the administration could not find power
cables to connect his site to the central power source in the
area. When he questioned this he was told to approach ISCOM to
have his power supply brought to Qwaqwa from Ladysmith in Natal!
In 1974, for no apparent reason, George Mofokeng was excluded
from the homelands four-man brickmaking cartel. In 1976 faced
with deteriorating health and imminent bankruptcy he decided to
sell his rusting machine to a South West African Construction
Company at a massive loss [3].
The case of George Mofokeng, like that of others collected in
Qwaqwa, strongly indicates that the orientation of BIC policy in
Qwaqwa was aimed at economic restructuring rather than at
nurturing the growth of an African commercial class. The reasons
for this, I believe, are explicable on the one hand by the
organisational weakness of African traders in Qwaqwa BIC era, and
on the other by the inepititude of the incumbent homeland leader,
Wessels Mota, to campaign on behalf of Basotho traders. In the
Transkei and Kwazulu, where the BIC has been heralded for its
constructive role in class formation, it might be noted that the
state faced African traders in organised bodies with clearly
articulated demands and with powerful local political allies.
The latter point is clearly demonstrated in the pressure homeland
leaders such as Matanzima and Buthelezi placed on the state to
elect Africans to the BIC board of directors, to lower interest
rates charged by the Corporation and to hasten the extrusion of
white commercial interests. In Qwaqwa, however, the legacy of
municipal restrictions on the extension of African trading
rights, the perpetuation of white commercial monopoly and the
deep-seated political divisions wrought after the Witsiesheok
rebellion ensured that Basotho entrepreneurs remained both
unrepresented and vulnerable to the domineering tendencies of the
white state. In setting itself up as an economic force in Qwaqwa,
the BIC was thus allowed to imposed its policies unfettered by
the demands of traders and politicians [4].
•The Politics of Opposition'
Relocation, Traders and the State
While disputes over the role of the BIC raged in the Legislative
Assembly in the early 1970s, population relocation to Qwaqwa
proceeded at an astonishing pace. Between 1970 and 1974 the
homeland's population quadrupled from 24 000 to approximately 100
000 people. Most of the new immigrants came from OFS farms, and
were dumped on arrival in temporary transit camps while
government bulldozers cleared large tracts of agricultural land
for the establishment of 'closer settlement' villages. These
villages rapidly mushroomed into sprawling slums similar to those
found on the outskirts of many third world cities. Banked up on
the slopes of the Maluti foothills, relocated families were left
to fend for themselves on urban sized residential plots. They
were expected to build their own shelters, dig their own pit
latrines and feed their children by acquiring work at a small
number of virtually defunct labour bureaus (cf. Bank 1984). Only
a small number of urban families relocated from towns and cities
managed to escape the favela-like environs of the closer
settlements. These individuals were settled in small municipal
housing estates with running water and flush sanitation in the
growing commuter town of Phuthadtjhaba.
The extent of population relocation to Qwaqwa shocked local
authorities. As early as 1972 tribal officials were complaining
that:
There are already too many people in the homeland. The areas
set aside for residential development are already overcrowded
and new arrivals are being settled on agricultural land. Our
resources are so exhausted that people will have to eat one
another in Qwaqwa (QLA 1972: 42).
Even the Chief Councillor, Wessels Mota, complained that if the
Qwaqwa government was not immediately granted more land, high-
rise buildings would have to be constructed to accommodate new
arrivals (QLA 1972: 39). But land shortage was not the only
problem: chiefs and headmen had to be appointed to administer
the new residential areas, taps and reservoirs needed to be
installed, schools had to be built and new roads opened. This
placed tremendous strain on the rudimentary administrative
structures of local authorities, who found themselves unable to
cope with growing demands on their resources.
The existence of minimal government enabled local entrepreneurs
to ignore state controls and respond directly to market
opportunities. The paucity of licensed traders in the new closer
settlement villages resulted in a proliferation of illicit
business undertakings. Backyard grocerers, shebeens, hardware
shops and clothing outlets sprang up everywhere. Hawkers walked
the streets selling anything from coffins to ornaments, while
vehicle owners offered their services in transporting these
operators backwards and forwards to nearby farms and towns.
Migrants also responded to these conditions by sending home
consumer goods for resale in the closer settlements rather than
cash which was quickly whittled away at local stores.
For some entry into the burgeoning informal sector was simply a
strategy for survival; for others it was a means of reinvesting
hard earned income with the aim of securing attractive returns.
Faced with wide-ranging business possiblities, associated with an
upswing in the migrant labour market, the latter owners felt
increasingly uncomfortable operating from small, unwieldy
residential sites and aspired to setting up licensed businesses,
in which they could operate openly without fear of harassment.
In this context of growing differentiation in Qwaqwa, T. K.
Mopeli's Bakwena-based Dikwankwetla ('strong men') party launched
its campaign to dislodge the ruling Basotho Unity party in the
1975 Qwaqwa elections. In striving to flesh out a constituency
beyond its narrow tribal base, Dikwankwetla drew attention to the
injustices perpetrated against Basotho entrepreneurs by the BIC
and'promised to institute a policy of economic reform to
safeguard the interests of local traders (van der Merwe et al
1978). Dikwankwetla's vigorous appeals to a petty bourgeoisie
constituency paid dividens when this party swept to power in 1975
by capturing 19 of the 20 elected seats in the Qwaqwa Legislative
Assembly.
Responding immediately to its promises of economic reform,
Dikwankwetla expelled the BIC from Qwaqwa in December 1975 and
set up a new Qwaqwa Development Corporation in its place. Soon
afterwards, in June 1976, new legislation was approved by the
Legislative Assembly to reorganise business licensing at the
local level. The Minister of the Interior, who also had business
interests in Kroonstad in the Orange Free State, explained that
the main aim of the legislation was to exclude the Harrismith
municipality from business licensing within Qwaqwa, and to turn
control over to the Tribal Authorities and the Qwaqwa government
(QLA 1976: 84). He expressed the hope that this measure would
rapidly advance black business development in Qwaqwa and would
bring to the homeland much of the money spent by local consumers
in 'white' South Africa.
The wave of enthusiasm which washed through the Qwaqwa business
community following this announcement was, however, shortlived.
In March 1977, almost a year after the passage of the Trading
Bill, considerable confusion still surrounded the new
legislation. Heated discussions in the Legislative Assembly
revealed that the District Magistrate in Phuthaditjhaba, a white
official on secondment from Pretoria, was continuing to obstruct
licence applications because he had not received confirmation
that Pretoria had approved the Act. The magistrate, it was said,
applied the letter of the old legislation concerning the standard
required of business premises, and could be moved to grant
licences only if applicants employed white lawyers to represent
them. One speaker remarked that the magistrate was 'mocking the
Basotho people' by making them 'wait about an hour to buy a box
of matches' (QLA 1977: 360). But these debates deliberately
exaggerate Pretoria's responsiblity for traders' grievances. In
fact, in spite of these claims, the total number of licensed
traders doubled in Qwaqwa between 1976 and 1977. Traders were
not irked by long queues outside their stores nor even by the
slow pace of licensing; their wrath was invoked by local
authorities who sought to enforce licensing practices as part of
a general strategy to assert law and order in the homeland. The
following case recorded in 1984 of an ex-trader from Tseki
illustrates some of the problems faced by small traders in the
mid-1970s:
Case 1: Terminating Unlicensed Trading in Tseki
In 1970, after spending many years as a plasterer in the
building trade in Ventersburg, JH made a successful application
for a cafe licence in the Ventersburg location. The store
opened in 1971 under the management of his wife and eldest son,
who was then still at school. By 1974 all three of JH's sons
had completed their schooling and were eager to help their
father expand his business. However, they soon realised that
the local municipality was not receptive to the further
expansion of black business in the town and began to consider
opportunities elsewhere.
Unable to transfer their urban rights to other locations in the
white area, JH's family began to seriously consider moving to
Qwaqwa where, according to Radio Sesotho, there were endless
business opportunities and attractive loan schemes offered by
the BIC. In response to these adverts, JH visited Qwaqwa in
1974 to negotiate an agreement to set up a shop in one of the
newly established closer settlement villages. He arrived at the
Bakwena Tribal Authority offices and went to meet Chief Setsoto
in Tseki. Setsoto was allegedly favourably disposed to having
stores set to help the Tseki people and immediately offered JH
two sites on which to start his business. With the support of
the local chief, JH returned to the Bakwena Tribal authority
and made an official application for a general dealer store in
the homeland.
Given the assurance that for a man of his experience the
issuing of a licence would be a mere formality, JH decided to
sell his assets in Ventersburg and brought his family to settle
in Tseki in November 1974. He hired a truck to assist with the
transportation of family possessions, building materials and
non-perishable stock from his Ventersburg store. Shortly after
arrival in Qwaqwa, JH enquired after his business licence and
was told that his licence application had been sent to the
District Magistrate for consideration. Anticipating a six month
wait, JH set up a temporary shelter in his backyard from which
he began to sell his wares to local consumers who were until
this time expected to walk several miles to Makong village to
do their shopping.
In April 1975, with his informal store operating at a large
profit, JH received notification that his application for a
licence had been refused on the ground that the building plans
supplied with the application did not meet local regulations.
He now forwarded a second application with revised plans, but
this too was refused - this time with no explanation. JH could
not believe the manner in which he had been treated by
licensing officials, and made an official complaint to the
Tribal Authorities. Two months later, and without any further
notification, JH was woken up by a contingent of Qwaqwa
policemen who informed him that they had been instructed to
demolish his business premises and confiscate his stock, in
January 1976, with his dream of pursuing an independent
business career in Qwaqwa shattered, JH was forced to take a
labour contract back to Ventersburg as a plasterer.
Disagreements between government and tribal officials, lengthy
bureaucratic delays and outright rejections of licence
applications encouraged traders of all descriptions to organise
themselves behind the Qwaqwa Trading Association (QTA), formed
shortly after Dikwankwetla came to power in 1975. In anticipating
conflicts of interest between 'business' and 'government', the
QTA had aligned itself closely with the National African
Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC) from November 1976 (Keeble
1980: 37). This alliance was, however, severely shaken in 1978,
when the QDC announced that it had invited Frasers, one of South
Africa's largest white-owned chainstores, to participate in a
multi-million rand shopping centre scheme in Phuthaditjhaba
(Ibid). The QTA was now sceptical of NAFCOC's ability to solve
its problems, and sought assistance from a group of Pretoria
attorneys. The latter drew up a memorandum stating the QTA's
rejection of the Tripartite Agreement system and the QDC shopping
centre scheme. This document, which claimed to represent the
interest of 350 local traders from all sectors was presented to
the QDC in September 1979 (QTA memo: 1979).
Opposition to the Dikwankwetla government in this period was not
confined to traders. Developments in other areas deepened schisms
within the emerging petty bourgeosie. Local teachers organised in
the Qwaqwa Teachers Association, became increasingly critical of
Dikwankwetla's education policy. They were incensed by the 1976
Education Act, which endorsed the central principles of Bantu
Education at a time when this system was the object of nationwide
political opposition (QLA 1977: 205). They also claimed that the
Dikwankwetla government had ignored its pre-election promises to
raise teachers' salaries in Qwaqwa to parity with those of white
teachers in the common area.
A number of teachers and traders were prominent in the formation
of a new opposition party, Mogka wa Setjhaba. The groundwork for
the organisation of the party was done in 1977, but Mogka wa
Setjhaba emerged officially after the No Confidence debate of
1978 when the Dikwankwetla chief whip crossed the floor with four
other members from the government benches. In the course of the
debate the new party quickly displayed the source of its support:
criticism of the Dikwankwetla was concentrated on four issues.
Firstly, the party slated the Qwaqwa Education Act for its ethnic
focus and general adherence to the South African government's
prescriptions about African education. It also, secondly, lashed
out at Dikwankwetla's failure to institute meaningful reform for
African traders. Thirdly, with an eye on other segments of the
petty bourgeoisie, the party accused the government of ignoring
its initial promises to 'Africanise' the local bureaucracy by
pointing to the leading role still played by seconded white
officials in all government departments, and to the continuing
disparities between white and black salaries. Finally, and in the
same vein, it criticised the tribal basis of homeland politics,
arguing that the existence of non-elected tribal representatives
in the Assembly ran counter to the established principles of
constitutional democracy (QLA 1978: 13-95). As one representive
recalled later:
The idea was not to exclude chiefs altogether. It was rather to
reduce their power through the establishment of two houses of
parliament, like the House of Lords and House of Commons in
Britain. In this set up the chiefs would retain their
traditional status, but would not be involved in tasks for
which they are not qualified, such as making laws on behalf of
the nation (Fieldnotes, Septemeber 1984)
In view of these concerns it is significant that the leader of
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the new party was headmaster of a local school and chairman of
the Trader's Association.
Dikwankwetla's response to the debate showed that it was keenly
aware of the new party's potential constituency, and sought to
defuse criticism by arguing for the legitimacy of a separation
between 'business' and 'polities'. The Chief Minister stated
that:
I want to explain and emphasise that Mokga wa Setjhaba should
be regarded as a front for the local Chamber of Commerce. But
we must further explain that they have disobeyed the policy and
the instructions of the chairman of NAFCOC, who stated that
businessmen or business organisations should not interfere in
politics as it is a dirty practice It would be a sad day if
our businessmen did not do what was expected of them and
decided to take somebody else's place, instead of helping the
nation (QLA 1978: 147).
Support for the new party came not only from various segments of
the homeland petty bourgeoisie. Evidence collected in the field
suggests that there was some degree of favourable response from
Dikwankwetla's erstwhile supporters in the urban areas of common
South Africa. In the 1975 election campaign Dikwankwetla had
promised to address some of the day-to-day problems of urban
dwellers, especially in the field of housing. After the election
these promises were left unattended, because the government
turned its attention to the growing number of relocation refugees
in the tribal areas within Qwaqwa. This shift in interest was
manifest in T. K. Mopeli's concerted effort to bring the tribal
authorities within the ambit of his government's power, and also
in his emphasis on land incorporation and rural relocation as
central political issues (Sharp and Martiny 1984).
The exclusion of urban dwellers beyond Qwaqwa from Dikwankwetla's
political programme caused further tension in the Legislative
Assembly in 1979, leading to the dismissal of two Ministers, the
Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Education (SAIIR
1979: 317-18). Both were influential urban representatives who
disagreed fundamentally with the Chief Minister on the
government's approach to the external, urban constituency. The
Minister of the interior had challenged T. K. Mopeli on numerous
occasions for directing most of his attention to the plight of
Basotho living in the Transkei and Bophuthatswana, while ignoring
the plight of urban families who were being evicted on a daily
basis under influx control legislation.
In 1979 the two ex-Ministers formed yet another party, Matla a
Setjhaba, bringing to three the number of opposition parties
within the Assembly. The three parties were, however, unable to
unite or form an alliance: the Basotho Unity Party was an
anathema to the other two because it endorsed the paradigm of
tribal politics, and there were strong personal differences
between the leaders of Mokga wa Setjhaba and Matla a Setjhaba.
The latter's leaders had been the two Dikwankwetla Ministers most
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closely involved in the bitter exchanges surrounding the earlier
breakaway by Mokga wa Setjhaba. Thus the two most recently formed
opposition parties, which shared overlapping constituencies were
unable to forge a united front to fight the 1980 elections.
'Reinstating the Tribal Paradigm'
Repression and the Politics of Patronage
On the eve of the 1980 Qwaqwa elections T. K. Mopeli was aware
that his power base had been significantly eroded by the growing
influx of urban traders and teachers into Qwaqwa. He also
realised that the urban experience and organisational skills of
these individuals were attracting support within the closer
settlements from aspirant entrepreneurs waiting for a chance to
enter licensed commerce. The fact that the QTA claimed to have
the support of 350 local traders by 1979 when the government had
only issued half as many licences must have been a disturbing
revelation. Moreover, T. K. Mopeli was aware that his
government's inability to seriously influence urban policy had
lost it support from urban voters who found it easier to identify
with Matla a Setjhaba's urban leaders. With these factors looming
large, the governing party decided to approach the 1980 elections
with the aim of suppressing political opposition.
This campaign was conducted on several fronts. Dikwankwetla used
its control over schools and other venues in Qwaqwa to prevent
opposition parties canvassing support. During my fieldwork
members of the opposition claimed that it had been common
practice for the government to prohibit opposition meetings at
the last minute and to send Dikwankwetla representatives to
address the assembled voters in their place. Another accusation
was that the ruling party had used chiefs and headmen,
particularly in the Bakwena area, to influence voters. It was,
for instance, noted that pitso (tribal court) gatherings were
used as a public platform by Dikwankwetla spokesmen. In the 1980
pre-election Legislative Assembly session, senior Bakwena chiefs
openly acknowledged their allegiance to Dikwankwetla and pointed
to the role they would play in influencing voters. Chief Haig
Mopeli explained:
No-one will be forced or compelled to do anything. We, the
chiefs, will only indicate the direction and say that in our
opinion this (ie. Dikwankwetla) is the government which is
acceptable to us and will render service to the nation (QLA
1980: 114)
It was alleged by my informants that some chiefs went so far as
to threaten villagers with eviction if they did not cast their
votes for the ruling party. Government spokesmen vehemently
denied these claims, but it was recorded at the time that
Phuthaditjhaba Town Councillors were preventing non-Dikwankwetla
members from obtaining municipal housing. This was documented in
an official enquiry into the housing issue which revealed that
Dikwankwetla membership cards were being used as a prerequisite
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for obtaining housing in the town (QLA 1979: 593-622).
The activities of Dikwankwetla outside Qwaqwa were more diffuse,
although some effort was made to canvas support from South Sotho-
speakers in other bantustans. T. K. Mopeli had offered political
asylum to Basotho refugees from the Herschel and Maluti districts
of the Transkei in 1976 (Streek and Wicksteed 1981), and he
played a major role in the establishment of the Onverwacht
squatter camp near Thaba 'Nchu in 1979. Onverwacht (now known as
Botshabelo) was set up by the South African government to
accommodate Sotho speakers who were being persecuted in
Bophuthatswana (Murray 1983).
Mopeli jealously guarded his role as benefactor of his ethnic
constituents in other homelands. In 1978, when the leader of the
Mokga wa Setjhaba attempted to enter negotiations with the
Maluti/Herschel South Sotho Central Committee (a body formed to
protect the interests of Sotho speakers in the Transkei) he was
severely reprimanded by the Chief Minister (QLA 1978: 149). And
in 1979 a blanket ban was placed by the Qwaqwa government on
political meetings by any of the opposition parties in
Onverwacht.
Dikwankwetla's ability to mobilise support in urban areas of
common South Africa was limited, despite the fact that the South
African police were prepared to intervene on its behalf. In March
1980 the police arrested a group of opposition politicians who
attempted to attend a Dikwankwetla rally in the common area; the
politicians were released without charge shortly after the
meeting ended. In April, one of the opposition parties laid an
official complaint that a South African police band had led a
Dikwankwetla procession through the streets of Phuthaditjhaba in
the election build up (The Friend 14/4/1980). To create an
impression of widespread support in the common area, Dikwankwetla
used government vehicles to bus local supporters from within
Qwaqwa to urban meetings (QLA 1980: 42).
Finally, it was alleged that, despite all these precautions,
Qwaqwa government officials tampered with the 1980 election
result, in which the ruling party ostensibly captured all 20
seats. Suspicion that the result was rigged led the opposition
parties to combine after the election to file a case against
Dikwankwetla in the Rand Supreme Court. The legal preceedings
were drawn out over four years before the court finally endorsed
the election result in September 1984. Opposition parties
immediately maintained that the court decision was politically
motivated (Fieldnotes, September 1984).
Although shrouded in controversy, the 1980 elections marked the
beginning of a new phase in the relationship between traders and
the Qwaqwa government, one which saw the decline of traders as a
force in homeland politics.
T. K. Mopeli's first goal after the elections was to take full
control of the institutional framework of homeland politics,
13
including the Tribal Authorities. This is documented by Quinlan
(1986) who suggests that the interests of the Mopeli clan were
promoted at the expense of the Batlokwa chiefs and were more
fully integrated into the central power structures of the
homeland state. As part of the latter drive, T. K. Mopeli
replaced the two urban-based cabinet ministers who were dismissed
in 1979 with the Bakwena paramount, Motebang Mopeli, and a senior
chief, Haig Mopeli. The passage of the 1983 Qwaqwa Administration
of Authorities Act marked the culmination of this tendency by
giving the Chief Minister discretionary powers to appoint and
dismiss chiefs. The new system also reduced the number of senior
chiefs in the homeland to ensure greater centralisation and
control of tribal affairs.
At the same time direct action was taken to rout opposition
operating outside the formal political structures. Although
excluded from the Legislative Assembly, opposition parties were
still active in Qwaqwa canvassing support for the court
proceedings they had instituted against Dikwankwetla. Mopeli's
first response to the impending court case was to strengthen his
links with Pretoria and distance himself from the opposition
parties. This was done primarily by his withdrawal from the Black
Alliance, a political forum established by Kwazulu Chief Minister
Gatsha Buthelezi to initiate discussions on the future of South
Africa by 'moderate' black political leaders. The Alliance, which
stood for 'one parliament, one government, one economy and one
citizenship' in South Africa (QLA 1979: 547), was opposed by the
South African government, and was strongly supported by the
breakaway opposition parties within Qwaqwa. In June 1981 Mopeli,
who had been a founder member, announced his resignation from the
Alliance in the following terms:
The unitary form of government that Chief Gatsha Buthelezi
together with Inkatha and the South African Black Alliance are
striving for is just a chimera which cannot be realised in our
present South African racial set-up (Lentswe la Basotho, June
1981)
Simultaneously, at the local level, Mopeli and his political
allies in the Tribal Authorities sought by all possible means to
undermine and suppress the activities of opposition parties. For
instance one prominent member of Mogka wa Setjhaba was served
with two banning orders which silenced him until the end of 1982
(Sunday Times, 24/9/1982), and others were banned for shorter
periods. Of crucial importance was the fact that several
prominent supporters of the opposition had their business
licences withdrawn and their residential permits threatened. The
threat of further withdrawals and the refusal to renew licences
caused a number of traders to review their adherence to Mokga wa
Setjhaba.
The following case study, drawn from my study of traders in
1984/85, illustrates the strategic shifts in political
allegiance made by one individual in this period, and shows how
the Qwaqwa government was able to undermine overt support for
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opposition parties.
Case 2: Reaching a Political Compromise
In 1970 MM fell foul of the influx control regulations in
Odensdalsrus, a mining town in the Orange Free State. He had
been recruited as a migrant worker on the mines, but had left
that job in the late 1960s, and had tried to set himself up as
a watch repairer in the township. After arriving in Qwaqwa he
had struggled for a number of years to establish a small retail
business, selling groceries and soft drinks. He was unable,
during this period, to obtain a license from the Harrismith
municipality, and was forced to operate the business from his
home in the town.
By 1977 MM was tired of the struggle to make ends meet, and
frustrated by official obstructions. He decided to join the
Qwaqwa Traders Association, where he could share his grievances
with others who experienced similar problems. With the help of
the Association, MM managed to obtain a retail licence from the
Qwaqwa bureaucracy. The licence was for a kiosk at the
Phuthaditjhaba sports stadium, where he sold fruit, soft drinks
and confectionery. During the week he relied on passing trade,
mainly from nearby housing estates, but was busiest at the
weekend when crowds of spectators came to football matches.
MM's involvement with the QTA after 1977 also brought him into
contact with members of the new Mokga wa Setjhaba party, who
provided him with advice and assistance in his business. Party
members provided him with small loans when he started, and he
used these to buy the first stock for his shop. By 1980 he was
deeply involved with the party and participated actively in its
election campaign. Even after the election MM remained a loyal
Mokga wa Setjhaba supporter, and offered to make a statement in
the Supreme Court about irregularities he claimed to have
noticed at the polling station at the sports stadium on the day
of the election.
Owing to this involvement, MM began to experience problems with
the bureaucracy, which decided to amend his licence to restrict
business hours, on the grounds that the Phuthaditjhaba stadium
was used only at the weekends. MM complained about this
'injustice' but was told that supporters of the opposition
should expect this kind of treatment.
With his business in increasing difficulty, MM reconsidered his
position carefully. In June 1981 he withdrew from the
opposition and joined Dikwankwetla. He also withdrew his
affidavit implicating the Dikwankwetla officials in election
irregularities. In return for this he was rewarded by being
issued a permanent cafe license in 1982. By 1984 MM had
acquired a site in one of the closer settlements near
Phuthaditjhaba and built a general dealers store. The store was
doing well, with an eye to possible expansion and
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diversification in the future, MM had become an active regional
organiser for Dikwankwetla.
The transfer of business licensing from the Harrismith to the
Qwaqwa authorities opened the system to a new kind of abuse. Its
transformation into an instrument of political patronage occurred
in several stages. Until 1978 licensing was in the hands of the
white magistrate and the change from the old system was
negligible. Thereafter authority in this matter passed to the
Minister of the Interior, who exercised his personal discretion.
One of the factors which contributed to the Minister's dismissal
in 1979 was that he refused an application recommended by the
Chief Minister (SAIRR 1979: 318).
After this incident the licensing procedure again came under
scrutiny and the new Mokga wa Setjhaba party argued that a
Licensing Board should be established within Qwaqwa, with
representatives from the Traders Association among its members.
The government refused and decided that the cabinet would take
responsiblity in this field. Abuse of the licensing process for
political ends now became much more widespread, especially since
the core of the opposition in the homeland lay within the QTA.
In 1981 steps were eventually taken to establish a Licensing
Board in terms of the Qwaqwa Business and Trading Undertakings
Amendment Act. When the Bill was discussed in the Legislative
Assembly, an appointed representative of the Batlokwa Tribal
Authority (the only 'opposition' left in the house) argued that
it was imperative for the Phuthaditjhaba Town Council, the QDC
and the Traders Association (now the Chamber of Commerce) to be
represented on the Board. The ruling party again refused this,
and complete control over the appointment of the Board's members
was given to the Interior Minister, who was at this time the
Bakwena paramount, Motebang Mopeli (QLA 1981: 44-67, 93-100).
After the 1980 election relations of patronage dominated the
political arena. Traders wishing to acquire licences were now
forced to demonstrate their political compliance with
Dikwankwetla's political aims. T.K Mopeli was unequivocal in this
regard when in 1982 he outlined the prerequisites for upward
mobility in the Qwaqwa bureaucracy:
We appoint supporters of the government into the civil service,
even if they are inefficient. We appoint them to thank them for
their support (QLA 1982: 453)
In view of the Qwaqwa government's renewed strategy to win the
support of the homeland petty bourgeoisie, business licences were
issued with great rapidity after 1980, ensuring that between 1980
and 1984 the total number of licensed traders in Qwaqwa doubled
from approximately 200 to well over 400. In rejuvenating business
licensing after disputes in this field during the late 1970s, the
Qwaqwa government sought not only to smother pockets of political
opposition within the licensed commercial sector, but it also
aimed to win credibility with a large group of entrepreneurs who
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had previously been prevented from acquiring licenses. Among this
group, which had certainly been active in the Mogka wa Setjhaba
Party during the late 1970s, were a number of civil servants who
wished to expand their resource base in the homeland by entering
commerce. Initially, it seems that these individuals experienced
considerable difficulty acquiring licenses, but after 1980 they
found easy entry into licensed commerce by registering their
business undertakings in their wife's name.
But while the Qwaqwa government made a concerted effort to
placate certain segments of the burgeoning illicit commercial
sector in Qwaqwa, it also used its enhanced power, manifested in
the growing size of the local police force, to exercise control
over the rampant informal sector. Evidence collected on the
shebeen trade in Qwaqwa during the early 1980s demonstrates a
rapid escalation of police harassment in this sector between 1980
and 1984 (Bank 1987: 202-207). Efforts to suppress the
uncontrolled shebeen trade were, however, clearly selective and
often depended on the extent to which illicit operators were
prepared to co-operate with the authorities on issues such as
crime prevention. This was endorsed by the Qwaqwa Chief of Police
who suggested in an interview that:
I do not want to say that there is only a dark side to the
shebeen business. There are some shebeens here in
Phuthaditjhaba which are an example to the maintenance of law
and order...These are model shebeens and they are given police
protection (15.1.1985)
A similar tendency of selective police harassment was also noted
in the long-distance pirate taxi business where illicit operators
came to rely on protection from the Qwaqwa government to soften
the blow of fines and imprisonment which faced them as soon as
they took their vehicles beyond the homeland borders. By offering
protection to these owners through the provision of rank
facilities, near the central bus terminal in Phuthaditjhaba, the
Qwaqwa government managed to win the support of an influential
segment of the commercial petty bourgeoisie. Taximen were an
important ally for Dikwankwetla because of their daily
involvement with migrant and commuter workers (cf. Bank 1987:209-
220).
Dikwankwetla's post-election strategy of co-optation and
repression sidestepped many of the basic grievances of homeland
traders. Nevertheless by 1982 the government had so successfully
split up its opposition that a new Chamber of Commerce was able
to emerge, seeking open reconciliation with the QDC and the
Qwaqwa Government. The Chamber was brought into existence by a
group of loyal Dikwankwetla supporters and within months of its
formation the new body had entered negotiations with the QDC. In
September 1982 the first of several meetings to discuss the
shopping centre concept was held, and the Director of the QDC was
soon able to report that:
The relationship between the Chamber of Commerce and the
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Development Corporation is excellent...Whenever there is a
difference of opinion the matter is discussed thoroughly until
a consensus is reached (QDC memorandum 31/1/1983).
He was also grateful that the new Chamber did not intend to
operate as a political party and stated that it evidently
realised that 'its objectives can more easily be achieved if it
has the active support of the government' (Ibid).
Although the Chamber opted for conciliation, it also tried to woo
the remaining dissident traders. In 1983 the Chamber sought
reaffliation to NAFCOC and associated itself with that
organisation's national objectives. Simultaneously, at the local
level, it refused to endorse a suggestion made by Dikwankwetla
that the Chief Minister should become the Chamber's Honorary
President. These attempts to project an image of autonomy were,
however, seriously compromised by the fact that all the Chamber's
leading executives accepted positions as co-opted members of the
QDC board of directors (Bank 1987: 82).
The growing trend towards political and commercial centralisation
was not without its tensions and contradictions. During my
fieldwork I was aware of strong conflicts of interest between the
QDC and leading Chamber officials. This was particularly apparent
in the area of real estate in Phuthaditjhaba. In 1982 the QDC had
pre-empted the extension of freehold rights to residents of the
town by investing substantial capital in luxury housing schemes
(QDC annual report 1982). These houses were offered for purchase
by residents at relatively high prices. Initially the scheme
attracted little attention, but after the granting of housing
subsidies to black civil servants in 1984, there was a sudden
rush for the new accommodation.
Leading businessmen anticipating a future demand in this area,
also sought to participate in the real estate market by
purchasing and developing property. Despite opposition from the
QDC, these entreprenuers managed to extract sites from the Qwaqwa
tenure board, and set themselves up in opposition to the QDC.
This caused considerable tension, particularly since the local
businessmen made extensive use of local subcontractors and cheap
labour, and were able to offer homes at prices considerably lower
than those of the QDC.
Another issue over which the new Chamber of Commerce and the QDC
clashed was the latter's reluctance to grant ownership of
premises in the QDC shopping centres. Chamber members argued that
the QDC was being deliberately obstructionist, by demanding
exorbitant rental from traders who could easily afford to
purchase these premises.
The nature of these tensions provide a clear illustration of the
composition of the new Chamber of Commerce: conflicts over
property development and the ownership of premises in shopping
centres were the concerns of a handful of elite traders. In
1984/5 the majority of traders in Qwaqwa felt increasingly
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isolated from the new forces in the homeland commerce. A major
complaint during my fieldwork was the request sent out by the
government, with the Chamber's blessing, for donations to the
Dikwankwetla party's 10th Anniversary celebrations. Recipients of
these requests were asked to enclose the amount they felt to be
appropriate to the occasion, which was interpreted as a thinly
veiled threat to contribute generously or face the consequence of
identification as 'dissidents'.
Given such pressures many of my informants referred nostalgically
to the 1970s as a period of trader unity and commercial progress,
and complained about the complete powerlessness they felt in the
face of growing centralisation in the homeland's economy. Many
accused the co-opted business elite in the Chamber of Commerce of
working hand in glove with the QDC, whose policies few were
prepared to endorse.lt was, indeed, reported that in 1984 only 50
of approximately 500 licensed traders were paid up members of the
Chamber. The lack of support and trust Qwaqwa traders had in the
new Chamber of Commerce was graphically demonstrated in September
1984 when NAFCOC President, Sam Motsuenyane, was invited to
address local businessmen at the opening of the Qwaqwa Industrial
Show. Although widely advertised, the occasion held at the new
Charles Mopeli Staduim attracted virtually no support from
traders outside the organisational structure of the Chamber. In
fact, as a QDC member confided in me later, "the whole episode
was a terrible embarrassment - it was probably the smallest
audience Dr Motsuenyane ever addressed".
In this section I have attempted to identify some of the
techniques used by the Dikwankwetla regime to gain control over a
dissident and politically threatening commercial petty
bourgeoisie. I have highlighted the insidious manner in which T.
K. Mopeli and his party approached the 1980 elections - how they
manipulated their legislative powers and government resources to
blot out growing opposition to the tribal political paradigm and
the Mopeli regime. I have also shown that in the post-election
period Dikwankwetla adopted a policy of co-optation and
repression as a means of breaking down existing pockets of
opposition and recruiting party support. In the latter sphere,
the formation of a new Chamber of Commerce proved decisive in
allowing Dikwankwetla to establish an organisational foothold in
the field of homeland commerce and to keep a close watch on the
political activities of small traders. Yet, in attempting to
explain the demise of class based political opposition in Qwaqwa
during the 1980s, it is necessary to look beyond the political
strategies of the Dikwankwetla party and consider the changing
political and economic complexion of the homeland petty
bourgeoisie during this period. It is to this issue that I turn
my attention in the final section of this paper.
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'The Silence of Poverty':
The Consequences of Economic Centralisation
The overwhelming election victory by Dikwankwetla in 1980 shocked
the political opposition in Qwaqwa to the core. It was clear from
the outset that Dikwankwetla had not taken its electoral
opposition lightly and would demand retribution for the
humiliation it had received at their hands. This reality played
heavily on the consciousness of Mogka wa Setjhaba and Matla
Setjhaba leaders, who realised that their interests would not be
served by remaining within Qwaqwa's borders. By the end of 1980
T. K. Mopeli had already banned party activists, threatened
others with eviction and drafted new legislation to control
political opposition [6]. In the face of these threats prominent
opposition politicians and traders were confronted with clear-cut
options: they could stay in the homeland and face restriction or
they could try to move to another homeland such as Kwazulu or
Lebowa or they could attempt to re-enter urban areas in common
South Africa.
In 1980 the third option was the most attractive for disssident
politicians and traders. The wavering of certain restrictions on
black business in urban areas after 1976, together with improved
prospects of loans with the establishment of the Small Business
Development Corporation, encouraged the emigration of selected
traders with urban rights out of Qwaqwa. Many of these
individuals had retained these rights by virtue of their
qualification as 'professionals'(ie. teachers or bureaucrats) or
through participation in the newly announced 99-year leasehold
schemes (Hudson & Sarakinsky 1986: 177). Moreover, the
announcement in September 1980 by the Minister of Co-operation
and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, that all scheduled municipal
elections would be postponed until 1982 when community councils
were to acquire full municipal responsibilities breathed new life
into the frustrated political aspirations of opposition leaders.
The prospect of controlling key resources such as housing and
business licensing in the townships proved appealing to
individuals who had often moved to the homelands precisely
because of the lack of political opportunities available in the
cities. For leaders such as Caswell Koekoe, James Ngake, Dr. E.
B. Tlali and others who had campaigned extensively in OFS towns
during the 1980 elections the move from homeland to urban
politics proved unproblematic and they were easily able to secure
positions on the new councils [7].
The option of urban migration was, however, limited to a small
strata of urban immigrants in Qwaqwa. For the majority of Mogka
wa Setjhaba members, especially those affiliated to the QTA,
there was no possibility of urban migration. For these owners the
only option open to them outside Qwaqwa was to apply for ethnic
reclassification in terms of the Homeland Citizenship Act.
Evidence collected in Qwaqwa suggests that some leading QTA
members managed to transfer their business interests to Lebowa
after 1980, but this was not always an easy option, especially
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when traders had developed a reputation as political activists.
In one case study it was noted that a QTA executive member was
forced to divorce his wife in Qwaqwa and remarry a Lebowa women
in order to secure entry into this homeland.
Although the exodus of dissident politicians and businessmen from
Qwaqwa was a major factor in the disintegration of the QTA and
its political mouthpiece, Mogka wa Setjhaba, after 1980, this
fact alone does not provide sufficient explanation for the
eclipse of these organisations. In seeking a more complete
account of this process it is necessary to consider the impact of
the expansion of white commercial capital into Qwaqwa during the
1980s.
The infiltration of white capital into Qwaqwa under the guise of
the tripartite agreement system, as I have already mentioned,
occurred in the late 1970s with the arrival of Frasers, Toyota,
Plate Glass, Sasko and Clover in Qwaqwa. Of these firms the most
threatening to small retailers, the bulk of the commercial petty
bourgeoisie, was Frasers, which in terms of their agreement with
the QDC was guaranteed a prime retailing site in the new multi-
million rand Setsing shopping complex opened in Phuthaditjhaba in
1980.
The opening of Frasers next to the central Qwaqwa bus terminus
had an immediate impact on small traders. Consumers from all
corners of the homeland flocked to the town to capitalise on the
stores opening offers. Many were staggered by the low prices
which they had only expected to find in the neighbouring towns of
Harrismith and Bethlehem. Frasers also benefitted from the
passage of approximately 10 000 SASOL migrants through the
Setsing centre every fortnight. The workers, who flooded into
Phuthaditjhaba in mini buses, disembarked at Setsing to purchase
basic household items before proceeding to their homes in the
villages by bus. Commuters working in Harrismith and Bethlehem
also found it more convenient to do their weekly shopping at
Setsing than to carry goods home with them from these towns.
One trader explained the difficulty of competing with the company
which dominated both the wholesale and the retail markets:
Purchasing stock for Frasers wholesalers became a farce because
many items were just as cheap at the Frasers in Setsing as they
were at the wholesalers. Our only answer to this was to travel
an extra 40km into Harrismith to use Metro wholesalers.
The impact of tripartite companies in Qwaqwa was spelt out by the
QDC, which estimated that in 1980 alone these operators had taken
approximately 5 million rands in turnover away from local traders
(QDC memo 1980). The majority of these losses accrued to Frasers,
which in 1982 were opened a second supermarket. At approximately
the same time Pep Stores opened a branch in Phuthaditjhaba, and
to ensure that rural families were not denied the benefits of
cheap consumer goods a number of Spar outlets were set up in QDC
owned shopping centres in the villages by 1983 [6].
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To fully grasp the implications of these developments for local
traders it is necessary to consider the following two case
studies, selected from a sample of 40 interviews conducted with
rural storekeepers during 1984.
Case 3: Facing up to Frasers Limited
HT arrived in Qwaqwa from Thaba 'Nchu in 1977, after resigning
his job as a clerk in the magistrates offices. He claimed that
the growing ethnic animosity towards Sotho-speakers in this
enclave of Bophuthatswana had encouraged him to pursue his
career in Qwaqwa. On arrival in Qwaqwa, HT was settled in
Bolata village and shortly afterwards acquired a job as a
clerk with the Qwaqwa government. In the course of this work
he dealt with applicants for business licenses and soon became
convinced that his future lay in the general retail trade. By
the middle of 1978, he had used his contacts in the Department
of Interior to process an application for a general dealer
licence in Makgalaneng, which he believed to be a prime.site
for commercial undertakings.
With the assistence of urban kin and a small bank loan, HT
managed to set up a small store in the heart of this growing
village. Benefitting from a fortuitous location next to a
large secondary school, his business did well dealing in a
wide range of basic consumer goods, including daily
necessities such as coal, parrafin and maize meal. His
experience in government service, complemented by his wife's
training as a credit controller in Harrismith, enabled them
to run their small business at maximum capacity. Indeed, the
ease with which he managed to repay his bank loan and purchase
his own means of transportion encouraged him to hire a second
store in 1979 closer to his home in Bolata. In opening this
outlet he simply transferred stock from Makgalaneng and left
the operation in the capable hands of his wife.
By 1980 HT claims that his monthly turnover from both stores
was in the region R8 000, enabling him to employ a full-time
driver and several female shop assistants. This enlarged
income also allowed him more time to socialise and to
concentrate on renovating his Bolata home. HT's upwardly
mobile lifestyle, however, ended fairly abruptly after 1980
when Frasers supermarket opened in Phuthaditjhaba. This
outlet's low prices soon encouraged Makgalaneng consumers to
walk the extra two kilometres into town to do their weekly and
monthly shopping. HT now found that his turnover on basic
items such as washing powder, tinned food, sugar and flour
decreased significantly. The effects of this competition were
exacerbated in 1982 when the lease on the Bolata store
expired. HT's wife now return to manage the Makgalaneng store,
while he resumed his responsibilities as driver and stock
purchaser.
The most serious blow to HT's business however came in 1983
with the opening of Fairways, a new Frasers outlet, and Pep
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stores in the Setsing II. This development reduced daily
turnover to approximately R100, forcing HT to retrench all
additonal labour in his store and to disrupt cash flows by
extending credit to enhance earnings. By September 1984 HT's
store was sparsely stocked and poorly patronised, even though
he extending shop hours and renting a television to attract
local interests. He felt embittered by his experience and
blamed the government for not keeping a check of the intrusion
of white capital.
The realities of growing poverty in the rural retail sector in
Qwaqwa had a dramatic influence on the social and political
profile of storekeepers. This was especially pronounced after
1982 with the return of the SASOL migrants from Secunda.
Increasingly as profits plummeted previously loyal opposition
party supporters withdrew from public life. They concentrated
with greater and greater introspection on their own business
affairs, relinquishing non-kin labour to cut costs and refusing
to honour their previous commitments to finance community
projects and opposition activities. Some owners even withdrew
their financial support for the ongoing Supreme Court hearing
against Dikwankwetla. Conspicuous consumption which had
characterised the rural petty bourgeoisie in the late 1970s was
replaced with frugality as traders neglected their homes, avoided
purchasing new cars and refrained from taking weekend trips to
Maseru. Confined to the sombre and depressing environs of the
closer settlements, these owners retreated into the domestic
security of family life. The rural proletariate with whom they
had earlier sought a political alliance were now depicted as
unscrupulous tsotsis, thieves and credit defaulters. This new
animosity towards the working class, reflected in traders'
tendency to exaggerate small differences, such as the size of
their homes and their hard working lifestyles (as opposed to
those of the idle unemployed), appeared to cloak their own fears
of proletarianisation and impoverishment.
Rural traders, as I encountered them in 1984/5, lacked the
security and self-confidence to speak freely about their
grievances, their deep distrust of the QDC, their suspicion of
the new Chamber of Commerce and their dissatisfaction with
Dikwankwetla control. Occasionally traders spoke bravely about
their repression under tribal rule and the extent to which they
were cajoled into towing the party line, but most often they
skirted carefully around all questions that seemed overtly
political.
But while rural retailer's discussed their prospects with
understandable despondency, there was nevertheless a small
contingent of specialised traders who spoke favourably of the QDC
and of the intrusion of white capital. They emphasised the
benefits of hypermarkets for Qwaqwa consumers and lauded the QDC
for its role in upgrading shopping facilities. These traders,
whose stores were located alongside those of Frasers in
Phuthaditjhaba, doted on the dense consumer flows at the Setsing
complex and the increasingly bourgeois aspirations of the town-
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based civil service. It was the wealthy butchers, bottlestore
owners and service sector operators with luxury houses on the
outskirts of town who formed the backbone of the new Chamber of
Commerce.
In conclusion then it is evident that the decline of the petty
bourgeoisie as a political force after 1980 was not only a
response to tighter political control and the dispersal of
opposition leaders outside the homeland, it was also a response
to structural changes in the class formation process itself. By
1985 the largest section of the commercial petty bourgeoisie in
Qwaqwa was increasingly being forced down into the proletariat or
back into the civil service. Stores were being leased out in the
villages on a large scale as licensed traders decided to cut
their losses and wait for an upturn in the market. Their struggle
was no longer a political one, but a personal one centred around
day to day survival and keeping on the right side of government
bureaucrats and party officials. But at the same time there were
members in their ranks who had benefitted greatly from economic
change. Specialised retail traders and increasingly building
contractors, who faced boom conditions with the announcement of
housing subsidies for civil servants, formed the core of a new
collaborationist petty bourgeoisie. These individuals were
thrived on the infiltration of white capital and state investment
in Qwaqwa. The realised the futility of opposition politics and
were prepared to use their position to exert influence on the
QDC. In the context of these developments it is not surprising
that the Dikwankwetla party struggled to find political
opposition in the 1985 election. The only party still intact, and
able to forward candidates for the election was the Batlokwa-
based Basotho Unity Party, which once again failed to get a
single elected member into the Legislative Assembly.
Conclusion
The political quiescence of the commercial petty bourgeoisie in
the face of economic disintegration is not a feature unique to
Qwaqwa. Recent studies of the changing fortunes of artisans and
shopkeepers in nineteenth century Europe present a similar
pattern, albeit over a much longer time period. Studies by
Blackburn (1984) and Haupt (1984) demonstrate how the European
petty bourgeoisie was first envigorated by the bourgeois ideology
of laissez-faire in the early nineteenth century, but
progressively retreated into rightwing conservatism after a brief
interlude with socialism at the time of the 1848 revolts. These
studies highlight the fragmentary effects of the uneven spread of
capitalist centralisation on petty bourgeois politics. They
emphasise the way in which artisans and craftsmen were the first
to respond to displacement by an advancing industrial
capitalism, while storekeepers, located in the distributive
sector, only began to feel the effects of economic centralisation
with the opening of department stores in urban centres towards
the end of the century.
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Three broad phases can be recorded in the response of the
continental petty bourgeoisie to the expansion of capitalism in
the nineteenth century. Firstly, it is possible to note an
initial enthusiasm and commitment to bourgeois liberalism and
the principles of free enterprise. Secondly, following a short
liaison with the working class, we witness a retreat into more
protectionist ideologies based on state intervention. And,
finally, with the disintegration of this class, we see a gradual
withdrawal from the mainstream of political life and a pre-
occupation with narrowly defined sectorial interest groups.
In assessing the rise and fall of the commercial petty
bourgeoisie in Qwaqwa between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s it
is possible to identify parallels in political posture. It will,
for instance, be recalled that in the face of restrictive white
control over commercial practice in Qwaqwa traders made strong
claims for the introduction of free enterprise in the homeland.
They lamented the rigid licensing regulations of the Harrismith
municpality and the controlled economic development propogated by
the BIC. In making this stand they associated themselves with
Dikwankwetla's promises of economic reform in 1974 and shortly
thereafter joined NAFCOC, which argued for equal opportunities
for blacks in the field of commerce. In the late 1970s, with the
introduction of tripartite agreements, these attitudes changed.
Now organised in the QTA, traders demanded protection from the
Qwaqwa government against white competition. They withdrew from
NAFCOC and employed a firm of Pretoria attorneys to convince the
QDC of the importance of middle class development in the
homeland. When these requests were curtly refused, they formed
themselves into a political opposition, which aimed to dislodge
the Dikwankwetla Party in the 1980 elections. This decisive
period, which saw the QTA and the Mogka wa Setjhaba fail in its
attempt to take control of the homeland state, marked the
beginning of the economic disintegration of the commercial petty
bourgeoisie and political quiescence described above.
The only aspect missing from this comparision is a political
liaison between the Qwaqwa petty bourgeoisie and the rural working
class. Attempts to forge a class alliance with the proletariat
has historically emerged as a fundamental political strategy of
the petty bourgeoisie, threatened by bourgeoisie economic and
political forces. The 1848 revolts in Europe provide an excellent
example of this, but so does the Witsieshoek Rebellion of 1950
which saw migrant workers, peasants and small stock owners unite
in a common front against the South African state. It is perhaps
interesting in concluding this chapter to ask, why in the late
1970s and 1980 was the commercial petty bourgeoisie unable to
form an effective class alliance with, the exapnding rural
proletariat in Qwaqwa?
The answer to this question lies in a series of factors. Firstly,
it should be noted that, unlike the stock culling measures of the
1940s which had a negative effect on the vast majority of rural
households in Witsieshoek [8], the introduction of commercial
centralisation in the late 1970s was generally welcomed rather
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than criticised by the rural working class. The arrival of large
white capitalist concerns in the retail sector exposed workers
and their dependents to prices far cheaper than those they had
come to expect from local storekeepers. The extent of these price
differences, in fact, bred a certain amount of animosity between
workers and storekeepers. This was exploited by the Dikwankwetla
party, which attempted to set itself up as the benefactor of
rural consumers. In 1979 the Minister of Interior, in fending off
trader complaints about the government's involvement in
tripartite agreements, explained that:
It is, of course, the duty of the Qwagwa government to protect
the rights of black traders, but on the other hand the
government has a duty to protect the defenceless consumer, who
is in the majority (QLA 1979: 237).
The conflict of interest between traders and workers on this key
issue was compounded by the lack of working class organisation of
the calibre of Lingangala, which facilitated an open alliance
between chiefs and migrants at the time of the Witsieshoek
Rebellion. The disorganisation and fragmentation of the relocated
working class in Qwaqwa predisposed this group to individualistic
relations of clientage (cf. chapter 5), rather than horizontal
solidarity through which they could articulate common grievances
and seek class allies. But this fact notwithstanding, the failure
of the petty bourgeoisie to win over working class support must
also be related to their inability to transcend narrow economic
interests. Common problems such as bureaucratic corruption, poor
amenities in residential areas, limited labour market
opportunities, malpractices in tribal courts and other misuses of
state power remained secondary issues for petty bourgeois
political parties, which remained obsessed with their own
material interests and with winning credability in urban areas.
Thirdly, by comparision to the late 1940s, the rejuvenatation of
tribal political structures and the advent of homeland self-
government served to mystify the sources of power and
exploitation in the homeland. Debates in the late 1970s over
whether certain grievances could be attributed to the local
political elite or to the national ruling class, which contolled
homeland finances and was able to veto local legislation, caused
considerable confusion in the ranks of the opposition. This
confusion was manipulated by the Qwaqwa government, which
constantly used the white state as a scapegoat for its own
political inepititudes. This, as we have seen, was demonstrated
in the manner in which Dikwankwetla blamed Pretoria and seconded
white officials for its tardiness in instituting economic reforms
immediately after the 1974 election.
In view of the evidence presented here it is clear that the
failure of the commercial petty bourgeoisie to overturn the
Dikwankwetla party and the tribal political paradigm in Qwaqwa
during the late 1970s had as much to do with its own inability to
construct a viable class alliance with the rural working class as
it did with attempts by the ruling regime to suppress political
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opposition. From this point of view it seems unlikely that the
structures of tribal politics will be seriously challenged until
such time as the homeland petty bourgeosie, now increasingly
located in the government bureaucracy, is able to address the
realities of closer settlement life in a way meaningful to the
Qwaqwa working class.
Footnotes
(1) These figures were extracted from the files of the Acting
Native Commissioner, BOV 1/200-210 N2/4/3, Bloemfontein Archives.
(2) This prediction was verified in 1978 when the CED finally
brought out the two remaining black bus owners and took full
control of the company.
(3) After persistent shortages of the bricks in Qwaqwa throughout
the 1970s the CED eventually decided to relinquish its local
allies and in 1981 invited CONCOR to become the chief brick
supplier in Qwaqwa.
(4) The above observations throw critical light on the long-
standing debate over whether the BIC operated as a class forming
agent in the homelands (cf. Molteno 1979, Hirsch 1984) or whether
it simply served the broader interests of white capitalist
development (Noluntshungu 1983). The evidence from Qwaqwa seems
to suggest that the basic orientation of BIC was towards
controlled economic development and not towards African class
formation. Concessions to black entreprenuers seem to have
emerged more as a consequence of pressure imposed on the state by
homeland political elites, than as a result of benevolence on
behalf on the Apartheid state.
(5) The active involvement of James Ngake and Dr. E. B. Tlali in
the Thabong Community Council is demonstrated by Haysom (1986:
20ff) in his analysis of right-wing vigilante in South Africa. In
describing conditions in the Welkom location during 1985, he
associates these two ex-Qwaqwa parliamentarians with the
vigilante group, the Phakathis, who perpetrated acts of violence
against left-wing political activists.
(6) The introduction of Spar outlets in QDC shopping centres in
the closer settlement villages did not occur under the auspices
of the tripartite agreements system. These stores were instead
ceded to blacks under franchise from white South African parent
companies following an agreement struck with the QDC by the new
Chamber of Commerce that Frasers would not be allowed to open
additional stores outside of Phuthadtjhaba.
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